What does free will mean to laypersons? The present investigation sought to address this question by identifying how laypersons distinguish between free and unfree actions. We elicited autobiographical narratives in which participants described either free or unfree actions, and the narratives were subsequently subjected to impartial analysis. Results indicate that free actions were associated with reaching goals, high levels of conscious thought and deliberation, positive outcomes, and moral behavior (among other things). These findings suggest that lay conceptions of free will (...) fit well with the view that free will is a form of action control. (shrink)

Four experiments supported the hypothesis that ordinary people understand free will as meaning unconstrained choice, not having a soul. People consistently rated free will as being high unless reduced by internal constraints (i.e., things that impaired people’s mental abilities to make choices) or external constraints (i.e., situations that hampered people’s abilities to choose and act as they desired). Scientific paradigms that have been argued to disprove free will were seen as reducing, but usually not eliminating free will, and the reductions (...) were because of constrained conscious choice. We replicated findings that a minority of people think lacking a soul reduces free will. These reductions in perceived free will were fully explained by reductions in people’s perceived abilities to make conscious decisions. Thus, some people do think you need a soul to have free will—but it is because they think you need a soul to make conscious decisions. (shrink)

Praise is a common feature of interpersonal interaction. It is used to encourage, socialize, ingratiate, seduce, reward, and influence other people. These assorted usages reflect a widespread belief in the efficacy of praise for altering the behaviour and affective state of the recipient. Despite this assumed power of praise, and despite its salience and frequency in human social interaction, research interest in praise has been sporadic and intermittent, and not united within an all-embracing theoretical model.In this article we will present (...) an analysis of the effects of praise. We will begin by considering how to define praise. Next, we will examine the view of praise as social reinforcement, a conception which roots praise firmly within an empiricist framework; this appears to have been the predominant theoretical view guiding previous research on praise. We will conclude, however, that this view is conceptually inadequate to account for the empirical evidence. Because of that conclusion, our next step will be to provide a novel examination of the likely processes and consequences involved in praise. The remainder of the article will then be devoted to examining, where it is available, empirical evidence relevant to our analysis. (shrink)

Humans, unlike other animals, are equipped with a powerful brain that permits conscious awareness and reflection. A growing trend in psychological science has questioned the benefits of consciousness, however. Testing a hypothesis advanced by [Lieberman, M. D., Gaunt, R., Gilbert, D. T., & Trope, Y. . Reflection and reflexion: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to attributional inference. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 34, 199–249], four studies suggested that the conscious, reflective processing system is vital for logical reasoning. Substantial decrements in (...) logical reasoning were found when a cognitive load manipulation preoccupied conscious processing, while hampering the nonconscious system with consciously suppressed thoughts failed to impair reasoning . Nonconscious activation of the idea of logical reasoning increased the activation of logic-relevant concepts, but failed to improve logical reasoning performance unless the logical conclusions were largely intuitive and thus not reliant on logical reasoning . Meanwhile, stimulating the conscious goal of reasoning well led to improvements in reasoning performance . These findings offer evidence that logical reasoning is aided by the conscious, reflective processing system. (shrink)

What makes us human? Why do people think, feel and act as they do? What is the essence of human nature? What is the basic relationship between the individual and society? These questions have fascinated both great thinkers and ordinary humans for centuries. Now, at last, there is a solid basis for answering them, in the form of accumulated efforts and studies by thousands of psychology researchers. We no longer have to rely on navel-gazing and speculation to understand why people (...) are the way they are - we can instead turn to solid, objective findings. This book, by an eminent social psychologist at the peak of his career, not only summarizes what we know about people - it also offers a coherent, easy-to-understand, though radical, explanation. Turning conventional wisdom on its head, the author argues that culture shaped human evolution. Contrary to theories that depict the individual's relation to society as one of victimization, endless malleability, or just a square peg in a round hole, he proposes that the individual human being is designed by nature to be part of society. Moreover, he argues that we need to briefly set aside the endless study of cultural differences to look at what most cultures have in common - because that holds the key to human nature. Culture is in our genes, although cultural differences may not be. This core theme is further developed by a powerful tour through the main dimension of human psychology. What do people want? How do people think? How do emotions operate? How do people behave? And how do they interact with each other? The answers are often surprising, and along the way the author explains how human desire, thought, feeling, and action are connected. (shrink)

Do philosophic views affect job performance? The authors found that possessing a belief in free will predicted better career attitudes and actual job performance. The effect of free will beliefs on job performance indicators were over and above well-established predictors such as conscientiousness, locus of control, and Protestant work ethic. In Study 1, stronger belief in free will corresponded to more positive attitudes about expected career success. In Study 2, job performance was evaluated objectively and independently by a supervisor. Results (...) indicated that employees who espoused free will beliefs were given better work performance evaluations than those who disbelieve in free will, presumably because belief in free will facilitates exerting control over one’s actions. (shrink)

„My sole purpose in this paper is to try and correct what I take to be a common misinterpretation of Hume’s opinions on mathematics. I shall not enquire whether he was right or wrong in holding these opinions. Nor shall I offer opinions of my own.“.

pt. 1. A critique of current educational aims.--pt. 2. Reason.--pt. 3. Education and reason.

We introduce a linear analogue of Läuchli's semantics for intuitionistic logic. In fact, our result is a strengthening of Läuchli's work to the level of proofs, rather than provability. This is obtained by considering continuous actions of the additive group of integers on a category of topological vector spaces. The semantics, based on functorial polymorphism, consists of dinatural transformations which are equivariant with respect to all such actions. Such dinatural transformations are called uniform. To any sequent in Multiplicative Linear Logic (...) , we associate a vector space of“diadditive” uniform transformations. We then show that this space is generated by denotations of cut-free proofs of the sequent in the theory MLL + MIX. Thus we obtain a full completeness theorem in the sense of Abramsky and Jagadeesan, although our result differs from theirs in the use of dinatural transformations.As corollaries, we show that these dinatural transformations compose, and obtain a conservativity result: diadditive dinatural transformations which are uniform with respect to actions of the additive group of integers are also uniform with respect to the actions of arbitrary cocommutative Hopf algebras. Finally, we discuss several possible extensions of this work to noncommutative logic.It is well known that the intuitionistic version of Läuchli's semantics is a special case of the theory of logical relations, due to Plotkin and Statman. Thus, our work can also be viewed as a first step towards developing a theory of logical relations for linear logic and concurrency. (shrink)

A critical and constructive discussion of philosophical questions which have particular bearing on the formulation of educational aims.

R F Dearden; Theory and Practice in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

R. F. Atkinson; XIII*—Explanation in History, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 241–256, https://doi.org/10.1093/a.

In Chapter 4 of his essay Utilitarianism, “Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is susceptible,” J. S. Mill undertakes to prove, in some sense of that term, the principle of utility. It has very commonly been argued that in the course of this “proof” Mill commits two very obvious fallacies. The first is the naturalistic fallacy which he is held to commit when he argues that since “the only proof capable of being given that an object is (...) visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner … the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.”1 Here Mill appears to hold that “X is desirable ”—a value judgment—follows deductively from “People desire x”—a factual statement. And the second is the fallacy of composition which seems to be involved in Mill'zs argument that since “each person's happiness is a good to that person … the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.”2. (shrink)

We present a full completeness theorem for the multiplicative fragment of a variant of noncommutative linear logic, Yetter's cyclic linear logic (CyLL). The semantics is obtained by interpreting proofs as dinatural transformations on a category of topological vector spaces, these transformations being equivariant under certain actions of a noncocommutative Hopf algebra called the shuffie algebra. Multiplicative sequents are assigned a vector space of such dinaturals, and we show that this space has as a basis the denotations of cut-free proofs in (...) CyLL + MIX. This can be viewed as a fully faithful representation of a free *-autonomous category, canonically enriched over vector spaces. This paper is a natural extension of the authors' previous work, "Linear Lauchli Semantics", where a similar theorem is obtained for the commutative logic MLL + MIX. In that paper, we interpret proofs as dinaturals which are invariant under certain actions of the additive group of integers. Here we also present a simplification of that work by showing that the invariance criterion is actually a consequence of dinaturality. The passage from groups to Hopf algebras in this paper corresponds to the passage from commutative to noncommutative logic. However, in our noncommutative setting, one must still keep the invariance condition on dinaturals. (shrink)

Historical materialism I take to be the view expressed in the well-known Preface to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) and exemplified in Capital and in many other writings by Marx and by Marxists. I shall begin with a few introductory remarks, next sketch in the theory, and finally contend that, despite real attractions, it too far limits the scope of legitimate historical enquiry to be ultimately acceptable.

Historical materialism I take to be the view expressed in the well-known Preface to the Critique of Political Economy and exemplified in Capital and in many other writings by Marx and by Marxists. I shall begin with a few introductory remarks, next sketch in the theory, and finally contend that, despite real attractions, it too far limits the scope of legitimate historical enquiry to be ultimately acceptable.

There is probably no student of modern philosophy, and certainly no listener to the Third Programme, who has never received the warning that he must on no account deduce an “ought” from an “is.” This prohibition, it is claimed, is securely based in established and unchallengeable principles of logic. Professor Flew was speaking for many others when he said, in the course of a broadcast entitled “Problems of Perspectives”, “I think it is very important indeed to make as clear as (...) we can and to underline with all possible emphasis that this is a point of inexorable logic”. And Professor Popper, to take but one other example, has expressed himself no less trenchantly: “Perhaps the simplest and most important point about ethics is purely logical, I mean the impossibility to derive nontautological ethical rules—imperatives, principles of policy, aims or however we may describe them—from statements of fact”—a view that is fully endorsed by Mr. Hare in his Language of Morals. (shrink)